We identify permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the nineties, when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule. Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the period 1960-2005, we identify 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively stable democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. We also classify non-reforming countries to stable autocracies and always democratic. We then use the dataset to test theories on the prerequisites for democracy in these countries that enter the Third Wave as non-democracies. Examining initially autocratic countries enables us to address issues of sample selection (in the beginning of the sample most developed countries were already democratic) and reverse causality (democracy can be both a cause and a consequence of wealth). Our estimates reveal that democratization is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education are also key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions will occur. These results appear robust to controls of the social environment (religion and fractionalization), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions.
Introduction
A vast literature that dates back to Aristotle has tried to understand the determinants of political freedom. According to the modernization hypothesis, democracy is more likely to emerge and consolidate in educated and affluent societies (Lipset 1959 (Lipset , 1994 . In contrast, Max Weber (1930) and Samuel Huntington (1993) have emphasized the role of the social environment. Religion, culture and fractionalization rather than income are the key determinants of political freedom. Following this presumption many express skepticism on the success of the recent steps towards democracy in many parts of the world. Yet, others argue that oil and natural resource abundance, rather than income or social norms, is the key impediment to democracy in the Middle East and Africa. Moreover, liberal economists, such as Milton Friedman (1962) , believed that economic liberalism is the key underlying factor leading to political freedom.
Building on these influential conjectures and the early contribution of Martin Seymour Lipset (1959) on the economic and social preconditions of democracy, many empirical studies have tried to detect the significant correlates of democracy. 1 Recently, the empirical literature has tried to move away from correlations and identify causal relationships (e.g. 1 See, among others, Barro (1999) , Jackman (1985, 1995) , Boix and Stokes (2003) , Muller (1995) , and Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O' Halloran (2006). 2 Addressing measurement error is important for many reasons. First, democracy is correlated with other features of institutional development, such as regulatory efficiency, corruption, legal quality (see La Porta et al., 1999) . Measuring, thus, carefully democracy is needed if one is to investigate the causes and consequences of each feature of the institutional environment. Second, political freedom indicators aggregate various institutional features, not necessarily related to democracy and electoral norms. Third, testing democratization theories requires the identification of regime switches. Yet, most indicators measure the level of political freedom and do not identify regime transitions. For example, the Polity and the Freedom House indicators by construction do not aim to distinguish democratic from autocratic regimes and thus are not well-suited to study political transitions. Fourth, addressing measurement error is important when one investigates the effect of democratic transitions on economic performance, since using mismeasured explanatory variables yields biased estimates (e.g. Papaioannou and Siourounis, forthcoming).
In this paper we aim to contribute to this literature on both the measurement and the causality front. To do so, we first construct a new dataset of political regimes and transitions during the recent "Third Wave of Democratization" (Huntington, 1993; henceforth 3rd Wave) and the nineties, when many former socialist countries switched to democracy (some, alongside independence). 3 To address most of the conceptual, measurement and aggregation problems we exploit many measures of political freedom, numerous historical resources, and electoral archives.
Second, we use the newly constructed dataset to test the main theories of democratization in those countries that entered the 3rd Wave as non-democratic. This approach stands in contrast to previous work that pools in the estimation always democratic, always autocratic, and transition countries. Pooling contaminates the estimates by reverse causation, since it is not clear if income or education for example causes or is the consequence of democracy. This concern is magnified since the distribution of political regimes at the beginning of the sample is not random. For example, the richest and more educated countries in the 1950s and the 1960s were all democracies. 4 Studying initially non-democratic countries appears useful to isolate the one-way effect of income, education, and other factors on democratization. While using predetermined values and focusing on non-democratically governed countries does not fully resolve endogeneity (since there might be long-term trends), this approach is conceptually appealing, since most democratization theories and models examine the conditions of democratic transition in oligarchic societies.
In our analysis we distinguish between five broad theories on the determinants of democracy. Some theories emphasize development-education (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer, 2007), fractionalization (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi, 2005) , religion (e.g. Huntington, 1993) , natural resources (Ross, 1999) , economic liberalism (e.g. Friedman, 1962) , and early institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2007) as the key determinants of representative government. Our estimates reveal that democracy is more likely to emerge and consolidate in developed and especially educated societies. Human capital rich nations also experience deeper political reforms. In addition, in these countries democratization tends to occur earlier. In contrast to the parallel studies of Acemoglu et al. (2005 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2007 ) the significant effect of education in predicting subsequent democratic transitions retains significance when we control for religion, fractionalization, natural resources, openness, and early institutional proxy measures. Our analysis also shows that natural resource abundance and some religious norms block democratization. We also find some weaker evidence that extractive early institutions were significant impediments to democratization during the 3rd Wave. Our estimates further suggest that trade openness was not systematically linked to democratization over the past decades.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we detail our methodology in constructing the data-set of political regimes and transitions. In Section 3 we lay down the main democratization theories and present descriptive statistics on the main correlates of the 3rd Wave. In Section 4 we estimate multivariate cross-sectional probabilistic models on the likelihood of democracy in countries that entered the 3rd Wave as non-democracies. In the last Section we summarize.
Methodology

Definition and criteria
Coming up with a definition of democracy is not straightforward. Dahl (2000) notes that "democracy has meant different things to different people in different periods"; likewise Przeworski et al. (1996) argue that measuring political freedom is "just too interesting to be resolved by a definitional fiat." Thus, in our methodology we do not impose a particular definition, but building on recent work in conceptualizing and measuring democracy (e.g. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002), we try to capture four key aspects of representative government.
The first rule is "free, competitive and fair " elections. The conduct of elections appears in almost all definitions of democracy we came along. Schumpeter (1942), for example, describes democracy as "...the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote." Similarly, choice of leaders is a key ingredient in Lipset's (1960) definition of democracy "as the political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office". We went over many sources to identify relatively fair and impartial elections. This was crucial since in many countries, that all agree are non-democratic, elections do take place but are either marked by fraud or are monopolized by the party in power (Golder, 2005) .
Second, we require that there is an actual transfer of power resulting from the elections.
As Mainwaring et al. (2000) write "elected authorities must have the real governing power, as opposed to a situation that in which elected officials are overshadowed by the military or by a non-elected shadow figure. " Thus, we identify permanent democratization episodes when there is a de facto transfer of power to a democratically elected government. In Bolivia, for example, the military did not recognize the outcome of the relatively free and impartial elections of 1980. The elections were recognized two years later when the brutal regimes of
García Meza and Celso Torrelio ended. So, 1982 (rather than 1980) marks the transition year to democracy.
Third, we require that there are no sizable parts of the population excluded from the franchise. Using information from Vanhaanen (2003) on electoral participation, we require that at least a third of the population should be eligible for vote. Consequently, South Africa during the apartheid era is classified as non-democracy.
The fourth rule is regime stability. Huntington (1991) writes "...Stability is a central dimension in the analysis of any political system." Thus, we exclude transition episodes where democracy was short-lived. Imposing the stability requirement is in line with most theories of political organization that focus on the determinants and/or the aftermath of permanent regimes (see also Glaeser et al., 2004 ).
Sample
We begin with all the 208 "countries" from World Bank's World Development Indicators
Database. We drop (34) 
Historical sources
Next we delved into historical resources to document the events that lead to the changes 
Electoral Archives
We then went over electoral datasets to identify the exact timing of legislative and presidential elections. Specifically, we utilized (1) Adam Carr's "Psephos" Election archive, (2) the "Elections around the World" database, (3) the "Election Results Archive" produced by the Center on Democratic Performance at Binghamton University, and (4) the "Database of 7 Examples of brief spikes in the two democracy indicators that do not represent the institutionalization of representative rule, include Nigeria (in the early eighties), Burkina Faso (in 1978-1979), and Argentina (in the early seventies). Changing the requirement to three, four, six or seven years yields a similar chronology.
Political Institutions" (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh, 2001) that reports data on the competitiveness and the timing of elections.
In most cases jointly with the elections there is also an adoption of a constitution that institutionalizes the change of power. The adoption of the new constitution and the elections either coincide or differ by one (two) year(s). In this case we use the latter date. In South Korea, for example, internationally deemed "free and fair" elections were held on December 1987. The new democratic constitution that established a multi-party democracy came into effect the following year. We therefore use 1988 as the democratization year.
Intensity of democratic reforms
Besides identifying countries that move in and out of autocratic rule, we further categorize democratic transitions based on the intensity of reforms into "full" and "partial" democratizations. 8 To classify a country as experiencing a "full" democratization, we require that both the FH status designation is "free" and the Polity score is greater than +7. (We applied this strict criterion to minimize self-selection concerns). Examples of "full" democratization include Spain after Franco's death or Chile after Pinochet's fall. In "partial" democratization countries, although representative institutions have been established, the level of political liberties and civil rights has not reached that of "fully" democratized countries. We also identify six borderline cases of democratic transitions, namely Comoros (1990), Iran (1997), Nepal (1991), Niger (1999), Pakistan (1988) 9 , and the Central African Republic (1993). In these countries in spite of some progress, political participation and civil freedoms are still at a very low level.
Democratization dataset
Our algorithm yields 63 permanent democratization episodes in the period 1960-2005. From those, 39 incidents are classified as "full" and 24 as "partial" democratizations. We also identified 3 countries, namely Gambia, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe, that experienced a political set-back, moving from a relatively stable democracy to autocratic status (one could also add Pakistan in this list). Non-transition countries are split into three groups: Stable democracies are throughout the sample period democratic (e.g. the United States, Sweden, and Japan).
Stable autocracies -always authoritarian countries are throughout the sample period nondemocratically governed (e.g. Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Uganda). Look-ahead bias Imposing the stability criterion and categorizing countries based on the intensity of reforms raises concerns of look-ahead bias. We have constructed the dataset after observing whether countries reverted back to autocracy. In addition, we assign a "full" democratization status to countries that have managed to reach a perfect level of representative institutions throughout the past 30 years, while at the time of the transition it was far from clear whether this would be the case. For example, we assigned a "full" democratization status to Spain, having observed ex post that the transition was relatively
smooth. Yet, in the years following General Franco's death it was not clear whether Spain will transit to democracy and quickly reach a perfect level of political freedom. While lookahead bias can not be ruled out, it is most likely of minor importance to our empirical analysis that explores the cross-sectional variation.
Initial Conditions and the Third Wave
In this Section we discuss the main theories on the determinants of democracy and quantify differences in the main variables stressed as key determinants of democratization using values before the 3rd Wave (mid seventies, when the first transitions occurred). Table 2 reports means and standard deviations for countries that have remained autocratic throughout the sample period ("always authoritarian" -column (1)), the group of countries that democratized during the Third Wave ("democratization" -column (2)), and countries that were already democratic before the 3rd Wave ("always democratic" -column (3)). In columns (4) and (5) we report descriptive statistics for democratization countries that implemented sizable reforms ("full Democratization") and countries that democratized before the nineties ("early Democratization"). This distinction enables us to investigate whether initial conditions also correlate with the intensity and the speed of reforms. Table 2 also reports a test of mean equality comparing the "always authoritarian" with the other groups. 10 
Modernization Theory
The modernization hypothesis asserts that economic development and education are the key prerequisites for democracy (Lipset, 1959 (Lipset, , 1994 . Wealth and education may affect the likelihood of democratization through many channels. First, industrialized and bourgeoisie societies are complex and difficult to govern under a centrally planned system. Second, the ruling class may benefit from democracy and thus will not oppose reforms. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) • Reduced Form Hypothesis [H 1 ]: Other things being equal, democratization is more likely to occur and stabilize in developed and especially educated societies. 10 We exclude from our empirical analysis the new independent states that emerged after the fall of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia (listed in Section 2.2), since these countries were non-existent in the 1970s. The results are similar if we were to include these new countries in the analysis. We also exclude "borderline democratization" countries and nations that experienced a reverse transition from the empirical analysis. The results are similar if we include borderline democratization countries in the authoritarian or the democratization group.
There is a significant correlation between the level of education and democracy across countries. In Figure 1 countries are grouped into five categories of roughly equal number of observations depending on the education level in 1975. Figure 1 illustrates that among the non-democratic countries with more than four years of schooling, all but Singapore moved to democratic government. In contrast, of the fourteen non-democratic countries with less than one year of schooling, only three (Mali, Benin and Mozambique) implemented democratic reforms. This hints that education was a key driving force behind the 3rd Wave.
In Table 2 -Panel A we quantify differences in the main variables stressed by the modernization theory as key determinants of democratization. The test of means in column (2) shows that initially autocratic countries that moved to democracy had more than 50% higher GDP p.c. than countries that remained autocratic. Differences in education are even more pronounced. While countries that have remained autocratic over the past three decades had 1.72 average years of schooling in 1975, countries that managed to opt out from autocracy had on average 3.59 years of schooling. These differences are magnified when we compare the "always authoritarian" group of countries (in column (1)) with the sub-samples of "full" (column (4)) and "early" (column (5)) democratizations. This hints that education may not only affect the likelihood of democratization, but also how fast and deep democratic reforms will be. In Panel A we also tabulate differences in life expectancy across the various group of countries. Using life expectancy accounts for the unavailability of education and income for many countries. In line with the modernization hypothesis, life expectancy was significantly higher in countries that democratized during the 3rd Wave than in countries that have remained autocratic (on average by 6.2 years).
Social Structure 3.2.1 Fragmentation
Influential scholars have emphasized the role of the ethnic and religious composition of the society in political development. Aristotle, for example, argued that democracy is the ideal regime for a society with many ethnic groups, since it is the polity that can best safeguard their liberties. Yet, ethnic diversity can block democratization if it is associated with a polarization of political life (Dahl, 2000) . Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2005) formally model the trade-off between delegation of power and "policy insulation" (ex post control of politicians). Their model yields an ambiguous effect of polarization on insulation.
• Reduced Form Hypothesis [H Wave are somewhat less fragmented than countries that have remained autocratic. The ethnic (religious) fragmentation index is 55% (40.7%) for the "always authoritarian" group, while 47% (39.5%) for democratization countries. Yet, these differences are statistically insignificant hinting that fragmentation had a small effect during the 3rd Wave. 
Religion
Many commentators advocate the importance of religious norms in political development.
Democratization may be blocked by religions that have a strong hierarchical structure and dogmas characterized by an unchallenged hierarchy. In addition, close links between clergy and the state may impede democratization. Huntington (1993) argues that traditionally strong ties between religious leaders and the State were present in Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim and Confucian countries. These religions tend also to be hierarchical and resistant to change. Huntington also argues that while the Catholic Church decided to abandon its traditional prejudices against representative rule in the mid-seventies, the Muslim clergy decided to re-emphasize its focus on tradition.
• Reduced Form Hypothesis [H R 2 ]: Other things being equal, democratization is less likely in countries where close links between clergy and state exist.
In Table 2 -Panel B we tabulate differences in the religious composition. In line with previous studies (e.g. Barro, 1999) , there is a significant negative correlation between Muslim share and the likelihood that a non-democratic country will democratize. The difference in the Confucian share between always autocratic and democratization countries is small (4.6%) and statistically insignificant.
Natural Resource Abundance
Many argue that the real impediment to democratization in the Middle East or Africa is not religion or the lack of development, but their oil-rich soil. Natural resources enable the ruling class to buy foreign and domestic support blocking political reforms. Acemoglu In Panel C we investigate differences in natural resources using a binary indicator that takes on the value one when the country is a main oil exporter and zero otherwise. Thirteen of the fifty-one "always autocratic" countries are classified as major oil exporters, while only Indonesia and Nigeria among the forty-nine countries that democratized during the 3rd Wave are major oil-producing countries. This hints that natural-resource abundance played a significant role during the 3rd Wave. We also examine the importance of diamond production in blocking political reform using an indicator variable that takes on the value one for countries that produce more that 1% of global output. Roughly 11% (6 out of 51) of "always authoritarian" countries are major diamond producers. Yet, there are no significant differences with countries that democratized during the 3rd Wave (column (2)) or "always democratic" countries (column (3)). Although, diamonds have helped financing autocratic regimes and civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo, many diamond producing countries are democratic (e.g. Namibia, Botswana) or have moved to representative rule during the 3rd Wave (e.g. Ghana, South Africa). We also experimented with gold production without detecting significant differences among the various groups of countries.
The Liberal Hypothesis
Liberal economists advocate the importance of economic openness in fostering democracy. Friedman (1962) argued that "economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom", while Landes (1998) In Panel D we explore differences in trade openness among "always authoritarian", "democratization", and "always democratic" countries using the share of exports and imports to GDP (data taken from the Penn World Tables 6.1 Edition) and a dummy variable that takes on the value one if a country has low tariffs and low quotas (taken from Wacziarg and Welch, 2003) . The test of means in column (3) suggests that "always democratic" countries had significantly more open trading systems than the "always autocratic" group. Yet, when we compare non-democratic countries before the 3rd Wave (columns (1) and (2)) we do not get clear results, since the difference in trade openness between "always autocratic"
and "democratization" group of countries is small (4%) and statistically insignificant. In addition, when we use the share of exports and imports to GDP "always autocratic" rather than "democratization" countries appear to be more open. Acknowledging these caveats, in Table 2 -Panel E we report summary statistics for four different proxies of early institutions. We, first, tabulate differences in property rights protection around independence, using data on executive constraints from the Polity database (that goes back to 1800). Compared to the "always autocratic" group of countries (in (1)), "always democratic" nations (in (3)) have on average better property rights protection around independence. Yet, there are no significant differences when we compare democratized countries with those that entered the 3rd Wave as non-democratic. The standardized 0 − 1 executive constraints at independence index is on average 0.26 in "always autocratic" countries (column (1)) and 0.28 in countries that democratized (column (2)).
Early Institution Theories
Second, we exploit the CIA Fact-book and construct an index of country-age (normalized to 0 − 1). Acemoglu et al. argue that country age may affect the democratization path, because former colonies that became independent in the 18th and 19th century had more time to modify extractive colonial institutions than countries that became independent during the 20th century. In line with this idea, the descriptives show that "always democratic" and "democratization" countries are on average older countries than "always autocratic" nations.
Third, we tabulate differences in the mortality rates that European colonizers faced in the 18th-19th century. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that settler mortality proxies colonial institutions, because in regions where settler mortality was high, Europeans set extractive institutions to transfer resources back to the homeland. In contrast, in regions with favorable conditions, the colonizers migrated massively and transplanted the good institutions of the motherland.
12 While compared to "always autocratic" nations (column (1)) settler mortality was significantly lower in "always democratic" countries (column (3)), the descriptives show that settler mortality rates are on average quite similar between "always autocratic" nations and countries that democratized during the 3rd Wave (column (2)).
Fourth, we examine differences in urbanization rates around 1500. Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that European colonizers established repressive institutions in densely populated regions to better control indigenous population. Their hypothesis is that population density before colonization should be negatively correlated with democracy. The descriptive statistics show that countries that are autocratic were significantly more densely populated before colonization than countries that democratized during the 3rd Wave (column (2)) or during the previous waves (column (3)).
Cross-Sectional Estimates with Initial Values
To formally test the five main theories we estimate variants of the following cross-sectional probabilistic model:
The probability that an initially non-democratic country i will experience a successful the modernization theory at the core of our analysis. Thus, in all specifications we control for a proxy measure of development. Yet, for many countries we lack data on education and income. Schooling, which is theoretically the most appealing variable, is unfortunately not available for many (especially non-democratic) countries. GDP p.c. in 1975 is also missing 12 Albouy (2006) has challenged the settler mortality data. He went back to the original sources and checked for misclassification, inconsistencies, and other issues. Using the new series Albouy shows that the relationship between settler mortality and contemporary institutions weakens. We also experimented using Albouy's series to find quite similar (insignificant) results. 13 The results are similar if we estimate linear probability models or if we perform logit estimation.
for more than thirty non-democratic countries. Thus, to expand the sample and address selectivity issues, we also estimate models using life expectancy as a proxy for human capital and development. 14 In Tables 3−5 we therefore report three otherwise identical specifications using the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP, average years of schooling and life expectancy to proxy the stage of development (indexed (a), (b) and (c) respectively).
Probit estimates
In Table 3 we test the modernization hypothesis against theories that emphasize the importance of religion (H (1.8 years) raises the probability of a successful democratic transition in non-democratic countries by almost 40% (0.217 * 1.8). 15 In model 1c we use life expectancy to proxy human capital. This allows us to examine the development-democratization link in an enlarged sample of 106 countries. The results with life expectancy are also supportive to H 1 .
In models 2a − 2c we condition on religion. The results suggest that democratization is less likely to emerge and stabilize in Muslim countries. The estimates imply that a 20% increase in the share of the population following Islam (approximately from Cameroon where the share is 22% to the Ivory Coast with 39%) is associated with a 6% − 9% decline in the probability that this country will permanently switch to democracy. 16 Turning now to H 1 the effect of income in predicting future democratic transitions weakens once we control for religion. The coefficient on income in model 2a becomes marginally insignificant (with a p-value of 0.11). Yet, education continues to exert a large and highly significant impact on democratization. The estimate on initial education continues to be significantly different than zero at the 1% confidence level, implying also a large economic effect. The estimates in model 2c also support the modernization theory, showing that life expectancy correlates significantly with subsequent democratization.
In columns 3a − 3c we control for natural resources adding in the specification an oil indicator that takes on the value one when the country is a major oil exporter and zero otherwise. Our estimates suggest that the likelihood of a successful democratization in an oil-producing country is 45% lower than in a non oil-abundant country (at approximately the mean value of the other controls). The probit results continue to support (and if anything strengthen) the modernization hypothesis. Once we control for oil production, the coefficient on income increases and turns significant at the 1% level. Education and life expectancy continue to enter with positive and significant estimates.
To test for the liberal hypothesis in models 4a − 4c we augment the specification with the share of imports and exports to GPD in 1975. The marginal effect of trade openness is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. We obtained similar (insignificant) results when we use the binary openness index (results not reported). This result is in line with Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) , who using an identification through heteroskedasticity method and examining all countries, document also an insignificant (and if anything negative) correlation between democracy and trade. 17 While not supportive to H 4 the estimates 16 These countries have similar (albeit somewhat lower than the mean value) life expectancy rates and income levels and a zero share of Confucian-Buddhist population. In addition, in these countries the share of the population that follows Islam is close to the mean value (34%). 17 De Long and Shleifer (1993) present evidence of a reverse effect of political freedom on trade. Using historical data on urbanization they show that during the period 1050-1800 European regions with oppressive rulers experienced slower city growth.
are in line with the modernization hypothesis. The coefficients on initial GDP, education and life expectancy in predicting subsequent democratic transitions retain their statistical and economic significance.
In Table 4 we test the modernization hypothesis against theories that stress the im- In Table 4 models 3a − 3c we use the log of settler mortality to proxy for colonial institutions. The sample drops considerably since the variable is mainly available for former colonies. While the coefficient on settler mortality is unstable, all three development proxies enter with positive estimates. The marginal effect on income is marginally insignificant (pvalue 0.13), whereas the estimates on education and life expectancy continue to be positive and significant at the 1% level. In columns 4a − 4c we use the log of population density in 1500 to proxy for colonial institutions. Urbanization in 1500 enters with a negative coeffi- In Table 5 
Ordered analysis based on the intensity of reforms
The 3rd Wave did not bring the same level of political freedom in all transition countries.
Some countries implemented large reforms, while in many democratization countries the level of civil liberties and political rights protection has not reached a perfect level. It is, thus, intriguing to test the main theories using an ordered model, utilizing the variability in the intensity of democratic reforms. Table 5 , columns (2a)-(2c), reports ordered probit coefficients testing simultaneously all democratization theories. The dependent variable equals zero for "always autocratic" countries, equals one for "partial democratization" countries, and takes on the value of two for "full democratization" countries. The economic impact of education in explaining the intensity of democratic reforms is large. We can use the ordered probit coefficients to compute the probabilities that the country at the 75th percentile of education (3.7 years, approximately at the level of Ecuador with 3.99 years) and the country at the 25th percentile (1.17 years, approximately at the level of Haiti with 1.07 years) will remain autocratic, or will implement moderate democratic reforms, or will experience a full democratization. The unconditional estimates suggest that the probability that the country at the 75th percentile of education will experience a "full" democratization was 66%; the analogous probability that the country at the 25th percentile of education will implement large reforms was just 12.7%. In contrast, the probabilities that the two countries will experience a "partial " democratization are quite similar, 17.4% and 15.2% for the country at the 75th and the 25th percentile of education, respectively.
Countries with low levels of education will most likely stay non-democratic. The estimated likelihood that the country at the 25th percentile of education in 1975 will remain autocratic is 72.1%, while the chance that the country at the 25th percentile of education will not experience a transition is just 13%. 18 Thus the model predicts that the most likely outcome for countries with high levels of schooling was to experience a full democratization. The most likely outcome for countries with low levels of education was to stay autocratic, and the most likely scenario for countries with intermediate level of schooling was to implement moderate partial democratic reforms. These estimates show that education does not merely shape the probability of democratization in autocratic countries, but it also influences how deep the political reforms will be.
Moving now to the other theories, openness to international trade and fragmentation continue to have an insignificant impact on democratization. In line with the binary probit results, there is also some evidence linking religion and institutions around independence with the intensity of democratization.
Ordered analysis based on the timing of reforms
Besides the intensity of reforms, the timing of democratization differed during the 3rd Wave.
Spain, Greece and Portugal, abandoned autocracy in the mid-seventies, most Latin America countries transit to democracy in the eighties, while many other countries democratized in the nineties. We explore these differences by examining how development, religion, openness, natural resources and early institutions affected the timing of transitions. Table 5 , columns but also useful in explaining how quickly these transitions will occur.
Conclusion
Few questions have received so much debate as to which economic and social factors determine democratic rule. In this paper we first construct a new dataset of political regimes and transitions during the 3rd Wave of Democratization and the nineties, trying to address many of the measurement challenges that such an effort entails. To do so we exploit many political freedom indicators, numerous electoral and political archives, as well as many other historical sources. Studying 174 countries in the period 1960 − 2005, we identify 63 incidents of successful democratic transitions and 3 reverse transitions from democratic to autocratic rule. We further classify transition countries to "full" and "partial " democratizations and also identify 6 episodes of "borderline" democratizations that one could add in the democratized sample of countries under a loose criterion. We classify the non-reforming countries to stable autocracies and always democratic. In addition we assign 2 non-reforming countries in an intermediate group.
Second, we identify the correlates of successful democratic transitions during the 3rd
Wave. To assuage reverse causation concerns we focus on countries that entered the 3rd
Wave as non-democratic and examine which conditions explain why only half of the initially non-democratic countries managed to participate in the democratization wave. Employing descriptive analysis and various probabilistic models we show that democracy is more likely to emerge and consolidate in educated countries. Education is also a significant predictor of the intensity and the timing of political transitions. While this correlation may still be driven by an omitted or hard-to-account-for country feature, we show that the strong impact of education in predicting subsequent democratic transitions retains significance when we control for religion, fractionalization, trade openness, historical factors, and proxy measures of colonial institutions. We also find some evidence that religion and political institutions around independence were important drivers of the recent democratization wave. In contrast, trade openness and fragmentation do not systematically correlate with democratization in the period 1975 − 2000.
We believe that while income, education, religion, and history shape the probabilities for a successful democratic transition, these factors do not mechanically determine the political equilibrium. No single factor can fully explain the development of democratic institutions in all countries and all periods. Democratization in each region and country has emerged from a combination of economic, social, and political causes. Besides the driving factors identified in our analysis, time-varying country-specific factors, such as leadership, civil conflict, and economic crises, can play also a key role. We believe that future research should explore these issues.
A Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources
Diamond: Indicator variable that equals one for countries that are major producers of diamonds (more than 1% of global diamond value production in 2005). These (17) countries are: Angola, Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, China, Congo
Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. We also experiment with another indicator variable that also adds ten countries that also produce diamonds. These (10) Senegal ( Column (1) reports descriptive statistics in the "always authoritarian " group (i.e. countries that remained throughout the sample period autocratic). Column (2) reports descriptive statistics in the "democratization " group of countries (i.e. countries that experienced a successful democratic transition in the period . Column (3) reports descriptive statistics in the "always democratic " group (i.e. countries that have been democratically ruled throughout the 1960-2005 period). Column (4) reports descriptive statistics in democratization countries that experienced a full consolidation of democratic institutions in the period 1960-2005 ("Full Democratizations "). Column (5) reports descriptive statistics in the democratization group of countries that democratized before 1990 ("Early Democratizations "). New independent countries that emerged after the collapse of Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia are excluded from the analysis, since these countries were non-existent in the mi 1970s (these countries are reported in Table 1 ; Panel B). Mean values, standard deviations in parenthesis and the number of observations in italics are reported for each group of countries. The Table also reports tests of mean equality comparing the "always autocratic" with the other four groups. The Table reports the difference, the standard error (in parenthesis) and the p-value of difference significance (in bold italics). Cross-section probit estimates. Probit slope derivatives (marginal effects) are reported. The dependent variable equals zero for always autocratic countries and takes on the value one if a country that was non-democratically governed before the Third Wave began (in 1975), permanently abandoned autocratic rule in the 1975-2000 period. Estimation is performed in all countries that were non-democratic in the beginning of the sample. To test for the modernization hypothesis for each model the Table reports three specifications, using the log of real p.c. GDP (columns indexed (a)), average years of schooling (columns indexed (b)), and life expectancy (columns indexed (c)). P-values based on heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the marginal effects. All specifications include a constant term (marginal effect not reported). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 1 reports the categorization of countries to "always autocratic", "partial democratization", and "full democratization" countries. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Table 4 Cross-section probit estimates. Probit slope derivatives (marginal effects) are reported. The dependent variable equals zero for always autocratic countries and takes on the value one if a country that was non-democratically governed before the Third Wave began (in 1975), permanently abandoned autocratic rule in the 1975-2000 period. All values of the time-varying independent variables correspond to 1975 (before the Third Wave of Democratization). Estimation is performed in all countries that were non-democratic in the beginning of the sample. To test for the modernization hypothesis for each model the Table reports three specifications, using the log of real p.c. GDP (columns indexed (a)), average years of schooling (columns indexed (b)), and life expectancy (columns indexed (c)).
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P-values based on heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the marginal effects. All specifications include a constant term (marginal effect not reported). The table also reports McFadden's pseudo R-squared. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 1 reports the categorization of countries to "always autocratic", "partial democratization", and "full democratization" countries. The Democratization Appendix provides details on the event identification methodology and gives a brief description of the transition. 
